



This is the fifth annual report by the European
Economic Advisory Group (EEAG) at CESifo. It
contains five chapters addressing the economic situa-
tion and different topics of policy concern for the
European Union and the euro area. This executive
summary provides a synopsis of the analysis and pol-
icy proposals of the report.
Chapter 1 discusses the short-term macroeconomic
outlook and policy options for the European econo-
my. As a main scenario, it is forecasted that GDP in
the euro area will grow in 2006 at around 2.0 percent
which is faster than the rate of 1.4 percent for 2005.
Overall, European growth remains lower than in most
other parts of the world and our forecast assumes
favourable developments in the rest of the world. The
chapter points to the risk of an undesirable mix
between monetary and fiscal policies in the euro area:
the ECB is likely to tighten monetary policy in
response to the cyclical upswing, whereas the stance
of fiscal policy will probably remain more or less
unchanged. Instead, for reasons of long-run sustain-
ability, structural budget deficits in the euro area
should be reduced. This would leave room for a loos-
er monetary policy than would otherwise be possible.
Key to a better policy mix is a restoration of incen-
tives for fiscal discipline, which have been significant-
ly weakened by the 2005 reform of the Stability and
Growth Pact. 
Chapter 2 reviews the current debate about global
imbalances, which have emerged as a result of large
and persistent current account deficits of the US.
The chapter presents and assesses different views
about the nature of the required global adjustments
and the extent of foreseen depreciation of the dollar.
The US deficits are largely matched by large surplus-
es in Asia, oil-producing countries and a few Euro-
pean countries. Though the euro area as a whole has
a close-to-balance external position, the possible
correction mechanisms imply major challenges to
policy-makers in Europe. The risks include a pro-
longed fall in the external demand for European
products, increasing competition by US firms and
negative wealth shocks due to a possible further fall
of the dollar that would reduce the value of Europe’s
external assets. The risk of financial crises increases
if the fall in the dollar is very pronounced and
adjustment takes the form of a hard landing leading
to a US and worldwide output contraction. There
could also be a reversal of US attitudes towards free
trade with negative consequences for Europe, if slug-
gish US external adjustment and over-cautious poli-
cy corrections by China and other Asian emerging
markets strengthen the political weight of protec-
tionist positions in the US.
The other chapters of the report consider selected
aspects of the general theme “growth and competi-
tion in Europe”. 
Chapter 3 analyses the growth performance of dif-
ferent EU countries. While growth has been sluggish
in France, Germany and Italy in the past ten years,
several other EU countries have done well. The suc-
cessful countries can be divided into two groups. One
group, consisting of Finland, Ireland, Sweden and
the UK, has relied strongly on the introduction of
new high technologies, in particular information
technology (IT). On the other hand, Greece and
Spain have also grown well, but they have relied on
traditional sources of growth – capital accumulation
and increased labour input. The different experi-
ences and the recent enlargement of the EU suggest
that the Lisbon strategy for growth and employment
should be replaced by a flexible approach: countries
on the technology frontier should rely strongly on IT
and other knowledge-based sources of growth, while
other countries should rely on accumulation of tra-
ditional capital and labour and use technology
transfer to achieve a gradual transformation towards
high-tech industries. Such an approach can incorpo-
rate the differences among EU countries in the
degree of technological advance. The key areas for
growth policy include improvement of education –
especially tertiary education – and IT diffusion,
together with measures that enhance competition
among firms in the economy. Improving competitionis vital for increased innovativeness and entrepre-
neurial activities in the EU. 
Chapter 4 discusses primary and secondary educa-
tional systems in the EU, as education is a major
determinant of economic growth. Education is a
public quasi-monopoly in most EU countries. There
are large disparities between countries in terms of
achievements in reading, mathematics and science.
These disparities occur among countries that are
similar in economic and demographic terms. The
amount of resources devoted to education does not
seem to have a large impact, whereas the structure of
school systems seems to matter a lot. On the basis of
empirical studies, we argue that simply devoting
more resources to education spending, or naïve tar-
gets such as reduction of class sizes, are not an effec-
tive way to improve school systems. Instead, policies
should focus on better organisation of schools.
Increasing parental choice and fostering competition
among students to get into good schools and among
schools to attract good students seem to be more
effective policy reforms. If designed well, such
reforms do not lead to unfair or non-egalitarian
practices. 
Chapter 5 considers merger control and competi-
tion policy in Europe, where merger activity is gath-
ering pace. Earlier, mergers were mainly an Anglo-
Saxon phenomenon. Higher merger activity in
Europe is driven by a combination of the long-term
effects of market integration and globalisation,
strong corporate profits and cheap credit.
Globalisation imposes restructuring in many sec-
tors, and mergers are a prime instrument. The poli-
cy challenge is how to allow the needed restructur-
ing and potential increase in firm size in some sec-
tors, while at the same time protecting competition.
This chapter discusses the trends of merger activity
as well as the rationale for it and the main princi-
ples for an effective competition policy. The main
conclusions are as follows. First, a vigorous compe-
tition policy is needed, but care must be taken not
to try to enforce low concentration in natural oli-
gopoly industries, where only a limited number of
players can survive. Second, obstacles to hostile
and cross-border mergers should be removed.
Third, the 2004 reform of the merger control proce-
dure in the EU was a step in the right direction, but
the current structure of decision-making should be
strengthened to improve checks and balances and
minimise the lobbying influences by national gov-
ernments and large firms. 
The European Economy: Macroeconomic Outlook
and Policy (Chapter 1)
Rises in oil prices are not likely to cause as high levels
of inflation in the industrialised world as in the past.
One reason is that central banks have over time man-
aged to keep inflation expectations at low and stable
levels. Furthermore, globalisation and – in Europe –
still relatively low capacity utilisation prevent firms
from fully passing on energy price increases to con-
sumers. Overall, there are no clear tensions in labour,
goods and service markets. This explains why in the
euro area core inflation, as measured by the HICP
excluding energy and unprocessed food, actually fell
somewhat from 2.1 percent in December 2004 to
1.4 percent in December last year. Headline inflation
in the euro area is expected to reach an average of
1.9 percent this year.
With respect to fiscal policy, industrial countries, on
average, stayed on a more or less neutral course.
Monetary conditions in the US and in Europe moved
in opposite directions in 2005. The European Central
Bank left its target rate again unchanged at 2 percent
until December 2005, while the US Federal Reserve
kept raising its funds rate. Assuming overall stable oil
prices and exchange rates, world economic growth in
2006 will probably be slightly lower than in 2005.
The US appears to be on a stable expansion course,
supported by all major demand components.
Tightening of monetary policy will, however, slow
down US growth somewhat to 3.4 percent. Especially
private consumption is expected to expand at a slow-
er rate. 
In China, the government will continue its efforts to
dampen investment demand in certain industries to
support a more balanced growth pattern. Together
with a small appreciation of the renminbi against the
US dollar, this will probably imply that Chinese
growth will be slightly lower than before, but remain
on a high level of approximately 81/2 percent. 
During the first half of 2005, Japan continued its
recovery. So far, it has mainly been based on export
growth, as the country benefited from strong develop-
ments in the rest of Asia and in particular China.
Growth during the first half of 2005 was supported
by domestic demand. As this is expected to continue,
the overall expansion of the Japanese economy will –
with a rate of 2.4 percent – be at a slightly higher pace




In the rest of Asia, GDP growth is likely to slow down
somewhat in 2006 as compared to 2005. The revival of
the global IT cycle at the end of 2005 and the begin-
ning of 2006 could support exports from the region.
However, the high oil price will – given the high ener-
gy intensity of production in many Asian countries –
probably lead to a further tightening of monetary
policy. Furthermore, demand impulses from the US
are expected to subside somewhat. 
In the EU, the slow recovery, which started during the
second half of 2003, made way for another phase of
weak growth already after one year. This lasted for a
good part of 2005 and was caused by a slowdown in
domestic demand and, in particular, a near standstill
of private consumption. During the course of 2005,
the recovery in the European economy gained pace
again. Annualised quarter-to-quarter growth in the
euro area reached 2.6 percent in the third quarter,
thereby allowing annual real GDP growth to reach
1.4 percent.
Since 2001, Germany has been characterised by very
weak consumption demand due to unfavourable
income developments and (political) uncertainty. Of
the larger EU countries, only Spain has experienced
strong consumption demand. This is to a large extent
supported by the continued real estate boom, but if
the boom comes to a sudden stop, there could be a
rapid slowdown in consumption demand and overall
activity.
In contrast to consumption, equipment investment in
the euro area continued its upward trend in 2005.
Given low inflation expectations and the continued
cyclical slack, wage demands were moderate. This con-
tributed to creating favourable conditions for invest-
ment financing. On the other hand, fierce competition
faced by European firms in export and home markets,
together with rising energy prices, put pressure on prof-
it margins. Furthermore, European enlargement has
shifted a greater share of total business investment to
accession countries where labour costs are much lower.
Investment in the euro area could therefore remain
lower than in previous economic recoveries.
Current and leading indicators point to improving
cyclical conditions in the last half of 2005 and the
first half of this year. Net exports are expected to
contribute to GDP growth by 0.2 percentage points.
Stable oil prices will allow profit margins to
improve. Together with increased foreign demand
as well as continued favourable financing condi-
tions, we expect that investment will grow at a rate
of 3.0 percent, which is stronger than in the recent
past.
Gradually improving labour market conditions and
moderate wage increases will allow private consump-
tion growth to increase somewhat in the course of
2006. Due to the continued recovery of the European
economy, cyclical slack will fall to approximately half
a percent of potential GDP. Growth of the euro area
is still lacking the dynamics observed elsewhere in the
world. On average, real GDP growth in the euro area
is expected to increase to 2.0 percent this year. Growth
will thereby be somewhat above trend. The growth
gap between Europe and the United States will nar-
row somewhat. 
The still weak cyclical recovery in the European econ-
omy raises fundamental macroeconomic policy
issues. One is how much the aggregate stance of mon-
etary and fiscal policy in conjunction should be tight-
ened. Another issue concerns the appropriate mone-
tary-fiscal policy mix. For reasons of long-term sus-
tainability – associated with future demographic
developments – there is a strong need for fiscal con-
solidation in the euro area. However, aggregate gov-
ernment net borrowing is at present very close to the
three-percent-of-GDP limit in the Maastricht Treaty.
The situation is not likely to improve much in the
next few years. In fact, the 2005 reform of the
Stability Pact has considerably weakened the incen-
tives for fiscal discipline: the possibilities of extending
deadlines for eliminating excessive deficits have
increased, and the scope for discretionary decision-
making in the enforcement procedure has been sig-
nificantly widened. 
As a consequence, a cyclical upswing in the euro area
is likely to trigger a tightening of monetary policy
rather than of fiscal policy, resulting in a growth-
unfriendly policy mix. In addition, there are fears that
the ECB may be about to restrain aggregate demand
too much by forcing core inflation too far below
2 percent. 
The risk of an undesirable policy mix in the euro
area has been emphasised in a large research litera-
ture. The original establishment of the Stability Pact
could be seen as a way of preventing such a situa-
tion from occurring. The de facto collapse of the
pact will make this very hard to achieve. It is vital to
restore stronger incentives for fiscal discipline, but it
is far from clear how this could be achieved over thenext few years. A re-establishment of such incen-
tives in the longer term would require bold political
initiatives: these could involve (i) stronger fiscal-pol-
icy frameworks at the national level; (ii) enhanced
fiscal policy co-operation in a smaller group of fis-
cally responsible EU states; or (iii) attempts to co-
ordinate monetary policy and fiscal policy reform at
the EU level, for example by the ECB offering gov-
ernments a monetary-policy reward, in the form of
an upward revision of its inflation target, as a
response to a restoration of a stricter fiscal-policy
framework. 
Global Imbalances (Chapter 2)
The large and persistent current account deficits run
by the United States from the second half of the
1990s have generated widespread concerns about
the sustainability of current macroeconomic imbal-
ances at the global level and the risk of disorderly
adjustment and slowdown in macroeconomic activi-
ty. This chapter reviews the current debate and dis-
cusses the implications of global adjustment for
European macroeconomic developments and poli-
cy-making.
Currently, large external deficits in the US are
matched by large surpluses in Japan, Asian emerging
markets, oil-producing countries and a few European
countries. However, the euro area as a whole is close
to external balance. The composition of external
financing of the US deficit has changed significantly
after 2000 with a falling share of private capital in-
flows (accounting for 90 percent of total inflows in
1997–1999, but only for 40 percent in 2003–2004) and
an increasing share of public inflows. A further
dimension of current global imbalances concerns the
high level of international reserves held in dollar
assets. At the same time, there has been a strong
expansion of cross-border holdings of financial
instruments, which have doubled since 1990 from
about 60 percent of world GDP to above 120 percent
now. 
Though the US current account deficit is large in
terms of US GDP, it is small relative to the stock of
US foreign gross assets. The US typically borrows
from international markets by issuing dollar-denomi-
nated assets but lends abroad mostly by acquiring
equities and foreign-currency denominated bonds.
Therefore, dollar depreciation leaves the dollar value
of US liabilities unaffected but raises the dollar value
of US assets and improves the US net foreign asset
position. 
There are a number of views on the causes of current
imbalances, with quite different implications for the
need for corrective policy measures. 
1. A widespread view attributes the persistent US cur-
rent account imbalances to low US national savings.
Private savings in the US have been trending down-
ward for some time and US public savings have also
deteriorated markedly since 2000. Some studies sug-
gest that the impact of fiscal consolidation in the US
on external trade is limited in the short run, but
greater fiscal discipline would certainly help reduce
imbalances in a longer-term perspective.
2. A second view of the US external deficits argues
that they are essentially driven by expectations of
high future growth. This view has two important
policy implications. First, it is not appropriate to
talk about “imbalances”, as trade flows are in fact
balanced in an intertemporal perspective. Second,
significant dollar depreciation in real terms may not
be required for some time and should therefore not
be expected. However, current expectations about
high US growth in the future may be too optimistic.
If and when expectations are revised downwards,
restoring US external balance would then require a
sharp correction of spending plans, possibly imply-
ing large movements in exchange rates and relative
prices.
3. A third view of US current account deficits argues
that the deficits are a mirror image of a “saving glut”
in the rest of the world. A variant of this view is that
there is an “investment drought”outside the US. This
view offers a potential explanation of the simultane-
ous occurrence of low real interest rates and low
investment. According to this argument, one may
expect interest rates to rise as soon as investment
picks up again.
4. A fourth view suggests that a desire for “export-
led growth” and a build-up of currency reserves in
Asian emerging markets have substantially con-
tributed to the current global imbalances. In partic-
ular, imbalances are due to China’s exchange rate
policy and its strong influence on the policies of the
other emerging markets in the region. China’s for-
mal abandonment of the inflexible peg against the
US dollar has not led to any significant appreciation




consequences of distorted relative prices, due to an
artificially low exchange rate and the threat of pro-
tectionist measures by the US, one should expect
some noticeable correction in the near future.
Predictions of further sizeable depreciation of the
dollar in real effective (multilateral) terms empha-
sise the need for a fall in the relative price of US
non-tradables, which is tantamount to a reduction
in US income relative to the rest of the world.
According to some studies, the required real rate of
depreciation of the dollar might be quite large,
depending on several factors that ultimately affect
the elasticity of substitution between traded and
non-traded goods in the US and between US and
foreign traded goods, as well as on the impact on the
level of economic activity. Many studies suggest
that adjustment could necessitate a protracted peri-
od of real dollar weakness. 
According to the consensus view, the most important
policy contribution to adjustment should come from
a reduction in the US fiscal deficits. Without any fis-
cal rebalancing in the US, a reduction in Asian sav-
ing, possibly associated with a slowdown or reversal
in reserve accumulation, increases the risks of finan-
cial strain in the global currency and asset markets.
Looking at the adjustment of global imbalances
from a “euro” viewpoint, there may or may not be
further dollar depreciation vis-à-vis the euro.
However, correcting the US current account deficit
in any case requires an improvement in US net
exports, and Europe is likely to experience a drop in
external demand with negative effects on European
growth.
It is possible that the resolution of current imbal-
ances will proceed relatively smoothly. However, it is
also possible that the current build-up of imbal-
ances will be followed by one of the “hard landing”
scenarios. Suppose that there is a disorderly adjust-
ment with strong relative price and exchange rate
movements and financial turmoil across markets. In
this scenario, it is highly plausible that European
financial and non-financial firms would suffer from
strong deterioration of their balance sheets and liq-
uidity shortages. This scenario would call for
European monetary and supervisory authorities to
stress-test their institutional framework. If the
financial crisis is moderate, the euro system may be
able to contain it. However, if the financial crisis is
sufficiently severe, monetary authorities may face
difficult trade-offs between financial stability and
price stability. Governments may then have to
shoulder large fiscal costs to stave off a serious
financial crisis. This would raise important issues
regarding the distribution of fiscal costs across
countries that policies to mitigate a serious crisis
would entail. In this scenario, the relatively weak
public finances in many European countries are an
aggravating factor, as they would imply undue con-
straints on emergency financing in the case of a cri-
sis. Increasing the fiscal room of manoeuvres in a
possible future financial crisis adds a strong precau-
tionary motive for stronger fiscal discipline now. 
Even if European monetary authorities were success-
ful in fighting financial contagion and other unde-
sired effects of liquidity shortages in the event of a
worldwide financial crisis in the context of an
unwinding of global imbalances, the euro area would
still in such a situation face a severe aggregate
demand problem. It would be difficult to deal with
this problem under the current framework for mone-
tary and fiscal policy. Perhaps the most important risk
for Europe associated with global imbalances is to
become exposed to a severe downturn without having
access to effective policy instruments to stabilise the
economy. 
Economic Growth in the European Union
(Chapter 3)
Economic growth has been sluggish in many EU
countries. Up to the 1990s, levels of GDP per capi-
ta in Western European countries were catching up
with that of the US, but this tendency was dramati-
cally reversed in the 1990s. In particular, France,
Germany and Italy have started to fall further
behind the US. The European growth problems
have led to major political discussions within the
EU. The 2000 Lisbon strategy for growth and
employment was an expression of the concern about
low growth. 
This chapter analyses the reasons behind the vary-
ing growth performance of EU countries. Our first
observation is that slow growth is not a universal
phenomenon among the old EU countries. Some
countries – notably Ireland, Finland, Greece, UK,
Spain and Sweden – have performed well over the
last decade. We are also beginning to see “growth
miracles” in several new EU member countries.
Second, a process of convergence in per capita
incomes in the EU is taking place. This process islargely driven by the convergence between the EU-
15 and the new member countries, that is, living
standards in the new EU countries appear to be
catching up with the old EU members in a long-
term perspective. 
Determinants of economic growth are analysed by
decomposing GDP growth into the contributions
from growth of labour input, IT capital input, non-IT
capital input and technological progress (total factor
productivity). Growth accounting reveals that the
unsuccessful countries, France, Germany and Italy,
have been growing mostly through traditional capital
accumulation and to a much smaller extent through
general technological progress. Labour input often
played a substantial negative role, particularly in
Germany.
In contrast, there have been different roads to pros-
perity in the successful countries. In one group, con-
sisting of Ireland, Finland, the UK and Sweden, there
has been a large increase in the contribution by IT
capital growth, though all production factors have
made a positive contribution in these countries,
including labour input for most episodes. In addition,
relatively rapid IT capital growth has been coupled
with relatively high total factor productivity (TFP)
growth in these countries. The best performer,
Ireland, has had rapid growth in all factor inputs.
Spain and Greece make up a second group of success
cases, which have primarily grown through conven-
tional capital accumulation and labour input growth. 
There are large variations among countries in the
determinants of growth in capital and labour
inputs and in factors that influence technological
progress. Finland, the UK and Sweden had higher
shares of IT capital relative to other capital already
before, so the recent fast accumulation of IT capital
has for this reason resulted in larger contributions
to growth. These countries are also at the top in
terms of indicators of IT diffusion. Determinants
of technological progress are likely to have been
quite diverse, as technological progress is influenced
by a number of factors such as education and inno-
vativeness of the economy. Finland and Sweden
had the highest levels of education spending (rela-
tive to GDP) among EU countries, but there appear
to be no systematic relationships between this fac-
tor and growth for EU countries. The amount of
regulation is one determinant of the degree of com-
petition among firms, which in turn influences
innovativeness. In many, though not all cases, the
successful countries have done well in terms of indi-
cators of deregulation, venture financing and R&D
spending.
Our analysis leads to several policy conclusions.
First, we recommend that the Lisbon strategy should
be modified. The Lisbon strategy argues for the cre-
ation of a uniform model of a high-tech information
society for the EU, whereas the European experiences
suggest that there are different routes to success.
Instead, the EU should allow for a flexible strategy
for growth, in which there is scope for high-tech dri-
ven growth as well as growth based on more tradi-
tional means of capital accumulation, increased
labour input and imitative adoption of new tech-
nologies from the leaders.
One key element in growth policy is improvement of
the educational systems. This should be done at both
the national and EU levels. Education influences
growth through the accumulation of human capital,
and there are also important complementarities
between education and the ease of adoption of inno-
vations and new technologies. An important question
concerns the level of education at which improve-
ments should be focused. Countries that are close to
the frontier should specifically focus on improving the
tertiary education system, as high-technology innova-
tions require more advanced skills than lower-level
innovations. The latter are often process improve-
ments and rely on imitative adoption of known tech-
nologies. 
While the US does not stand out in the quality of
secondary education, it is well ahead of EU coun-
tries in university education, which is likely to mat-
ter the most for economic growth of the most
advanced countries. The best universities in the US
compete strongly with each other for the best grad-
uate students and researchers. In European coun-
tries, the university system is largely not exposed to
strong competition, though the UK with its nation-
al research and teaching quality audits is partly an
exception.
A third policy conclusion concerns the potential to
increase labour input to enhance economic growth.
In most EU countries, labour input has not grown
much, and in some countries labour input growth
was even negative for some periods. Labour input
can be raised through labour market reforms such as
lower unemployment benefits, employment tax cred-




reforms providing incentives to a longer working life.
Decentralised collective agreements that allow
lengthening working hours (as in Germany) and
reversals of earlier legislated working time reduc-
tions (for example in France) are other desirable
measures.
Another policy conclusion concerns the regulatory
policies in the EU. Europe tends to have a relatively
high level of regulations that limit competition by
restricting entrepreneurial activities, entry and
labour market adaptability, which in turn can sup-
press innovation and technological advancements.
Growth effects of competition appear to depend on
the distance of the industry from the technology
frontier, so that increased competition yields the
largest productivity gains in sectors that are far
behind the frontier. Technology policy should focus
on provision of opportunities for creation of new
firms and industries and less on glorifying national
champions. Improvements of venture capital financ-
ing and R&D continue to be important policy areas
for the EU countries. There are big variations in the
amount of venture capital investments in the EU,
and Europe is lagging behind the US in this respect.
Also, competition policies should focus more on
facilitating entry of new firms to improve innova-
tiveness of European economies.
Reduction of trade barriers to competition and entry
in the service sector is important, as exporters of ser-
vices tend to be subjected to national regulations in
both the country of origin and in the host country.
Since the service sector makes up around 70 percent
of both GDP and employment in the EU-15, lower
trade barriers for services have potentially large
growth effects. For this reason, it is important that
the new EU Services Directive under discussion is not
watered down. A related issue is that the imposition
of national pay conditions on posted workers from
other EU member states prevents effective cross-bor-
der price competition. This limits the gains from
trade in services to economies of scale, more effective
organisation and greater product diversity. It also
means that the old EU member states forsake the
welfare gains that could come from allowing service
providers from the new member states to compete
effectively by compensating for lower productivity
through lower wages. Such competition is a natural
exploitation of different comparative advantages. It
is not “unfair wage dumping”. Wage competition
among countries in trade with services should be
allowed in the same way as in trade with goods. 
Growth-enhancing policies for new EU member
countries include facilitating technology transfer and
improvement of productivity in industries that are
mostly behind the high-technology frontier. Educa-
tion policy and financing of new firms and innova-
tions continue to be major items in the policy agenda
for the new EU members. 
Prospects for Education Policy in Europe 
(Chapter 4)
Education is an important productive input into the
wealth of a nation. It enhances individual productivi-
ty, which shows up in higher wages. The rate of sec-
ondary enrolment comes out as one of the significant
determinants of differences in GDP per capita across
countries. Also, an educated workforce is a valuable
asset at times of rapid technological change, because
educated workers are better at adopting new tech-
nologies. 
In most European countries, the public sector holds a
quasi-monopoly on the provision of education. While
government intervention may be justified on the
grounds that education has social aspects and that
parents’ decisions may not reflect their children’s best
interest, it is not clear that direct provision is the ade-
quate form of government intervention. One may
consider a more decentralised approach that would
contain costs and allow for greater diversity of indi-
vidual choices.
In many countries, primary and secondary education-
al systems are under pressure. On the one hand, the
costs of education are soaring as both enrolment rates
and the length of studies trend upward, while the cost
per pupil grows as fast as GDP per capita. On the
other hand, there is a perception that standards and
achievements are going down. 
Some argue that in order to solve these issues, one
should spend more resources on facilities, hire more
teachers to reduce class size, and perhaps employ
more staff to take care of discipline and other non-
curricular aspects. Others insist that educational sys-
tems can be made a lot more efficient by relying on
competition and free parental choice.
What does the evidence say?
We observe large disparities between countries in
terms of achievements in reading, mathematics, andscience. These disparities occur among countries
that are similar in economic and demographic
terms. Therefore, the way schools are organised
seems to matter a lot. Furthermore, the amount of
resources devoted to education does not seem to
have a large impact. In a cross section of countries,
it only has a small impact on achievements; the US
spends a large amount per student, but does worse
than the Slovak Republic that spends only little.
Econometric studies at the individual level suggest
that traditional recipes based on increased spending
fail. For example, there is hardly any evidence that
reducing class size has any impact on achievement.
These findings are confirmed by event studies such
as those of the unsuccessful French “Zone d’Edu-
cation Prioritaire” experience.
On the other hand, a growing body of empirical stud-
ies that compare similar groups of pupils exposed to
different policies suggests that enhancing competition
between schools has positive effects on achievements.
Competitive mechanisms re-allocate resources from
the worse to the best schools by allowing parents to
choose and by adjusting school resources so that the
successful schools can grow to accommodate
increased demand. 
These mechanisms can take different forms: they can
rely on the private sector to different degrees and
involve different compensation mechanisms in order
to offset potential unwanted effects on the distribu-
tion of income. For example, vouchers of some
amount can be given to attend private schools. The
amount of vouchers can be adjusted to reflect distri-
butional concerns. It has been shown that such
schemes also benefit pupils who continue to attend
public schools, because these are disciplined by com-
petition from private schools. Hence, even students
that are too poor to attend a private school, despite
the voucher, indirectly benefit from school competi-
tion. But one can also think of other mechanisms
where parental choice is increased and management
is decentralised to the school level, but where there is
less reliance on monetary rewards and smaller distri-
butional effects. 
The organisation of public schools has a large impact
on achievements. Mere increases in spending, in par-
ticular in the form of smaller classes, seem to be an
inefficient way of raising achievements. In contrast,
substantial improvements can be obtained if one fos-
ters competition, both among students to get into the
good schools and among schools to attract the good
students. The available evidence suggests that while
raising performance, such policies would not be par-
ticularly “unfair” or “non-egalitarian” relative to cur-
rent practices.
Mergers and Competition Policy in Europe
(Chapter 5)
Merger activity is gathering pace in Europe. 2005 has
seen large-value mergers or acquisitions such as Italy’s
Unicredito of Germany’s HVB in the banking indus-
try and France’s Pernod Ricard of the UK’s Allied
Domecq in the food and drink sector. The pace of
activity in utilities has been especially hectic and
France’s Suez has acquired Belgium’s Electrabel,
France Telecom has bought Spain’s Amena and
Telefónica (Spain) has launched a bid for O2 (UK).
Within Spain, Gas Natural has also announced its
intention to take over Endesa in the largest operation
of the year. At the same time, private equity firms
(mostly British and American) are buying up firms, in
particular conglomerates, with a view to restructure
them and sell them for a profit. Not so long ago,
mergers were basically an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon.
However, the end of the millennium merger wave was
driven, at least in terms of cross-border operations
that have been gaining weight in the total, by activity
in the EU-15.
This reflects the long-term effects of market integra-
tion in Europe. But broader trends in the world econ-
omy are also important – the revolution in informa-
tion technology, the widening of markets, the strength
of corporate profits and the availability of cheap
credit. Globalisation, especially in the form of com-
petition from emerging economies like China and
India, has induced restructuring and redeployment to
increase productivity, and mergers are an integral part
of these processes.
Mergers raise a host of public policy issues. It is not
clear that mergers create value for shareholders and
consumers. A consolidation wave poses a threat to
competition, which is the main driver of economic
efficiency and productivity growth. The preservation
of competition in different markets is of utmost
importance. Domestic mergers are generally more
threatening to competition than cross-border ones. It
may be agreed that globalisation lessens the need for
merger control, but it is important to establish that




ing that the merger wave is good not only for invest-
ment bankers but also for consumers.
A related issue is that many European governments
have a protectionist instinct and view with suspi-
cion foreign takeovers of their national champions
or of firms that are considered to be in strategic
sectors. Banking and utilities are often viewed as
examples of such sectors. France and Italy tend to
protect their firms, as shown by, for example, the
discussion over whether French Danone could be
taken over by PepsiCo, and the obstacles put by the
former governor of the Bank of Italy to the foreign
takeover of Antonveneta and BNL. France has
issued a list of strategic sectors where national
interests are to be protected. Despite this, the trend
towards cross-border mergers seems robust. The
public policy question is whether ownership mat-
ters and whether Europe needs either national or
European champions.
Globalisation is associated with technological change,
with decreases in trade and transport costs of goods,
capital, people and information, and with liberalisa-
tion and market integration that simultaneously
enlarge the market and increase competitive pressure.
In many sectors, the number of firms will have to be
reduced in an integrated or enlarged market to reap
economies of scale. At the same time, a sufficient level
of competition is needed for innovation, and the time-
ly termination of bad projects drives productivity
growth. Furthermore, domestic competition is a key
to international success and competitiveness, whereas
fostering national champions may be self-defeating.
The policy challenge is how to allow the needed re-
structuring and potential increase in firm size in some
sectors, while at the same time protecting compe-
tition.
Our first conclusion is that a vigorous competition
policy is needed, but care must be taken not to try to
enforce low concentration in natural oligopoly indus-
tries where only a limited number of firms can sur-
vive. Furthermore, merger control should take into
account the need of a larger firm size in several indus-
tries and the potential dynamic efficiencies (for exam-
ple innovation) generated by mergers.
A second conclusion is that artificial obstacles to hos-
tile and cross-border mergers should be removed in
Europe. Hostile takeovers are a sign of health of the
market for corporate control. Cross-border mergers
should proceed without regulatory obstacles as they
may keep in check the increase in domestic concen-
tration. We acknowledge that ownership is not neu-
tral, in particular, in some industries like banking
where relationships are important, but on balance this
is insufficient justification for protectionism. Euro-
pean as well as national competition policy must play
a major role in keeping markets open.
A third conclusion is that care must be taken in not
promoting European champions that end up being
effectively protected from closure. Can the indepen-
dence of competition policy be maintained given the
politics of the Commission? States can lobby
Commissioners and other Directorates than the one
for competition (like Industry or Energy) to further
national policies. Such lobbying would be hard to
resist if it is done simultaneously by more than one
large EU member state. An independent institutional
body might protect competition policy from these
industrial policy pressures.
Fourth, the 2004 reform of the merger control proce-
dure in the EU was a step in the right direction,
increasing checks and balances for merging parties
and the role of economic analysis. However, the guar-
antees for the parties, the quality of analysis and deci-
sion-making, as well as the protection against the lob-
bying pressures of national governments and firms
could still be improved. One example of an independ-
ent institutional body would be an administrative
panel, which is located within the Commission and
recommends or even decides on merger cases. An-
other possibility would be a European Competition
Agency. 